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STEIN

CASE STUDY
The Long Island City Power Outage
Settlement: A Case Study in
Alternative Dispute Resolution
ELEANOR STEIN ∗
INTRODUCTION
In April 2008, an extraordinary agreement—styled a Joint
Proposal—was reached among an adversarial array of
government, industry, community, and public interest parties.
The Joint Proposal, negotiated over the course of a year, ended an
inquiry conducted by the New York State Public Service
Commission (NYPSC or Commission), the state administrative
agency that regulates New York’s investor-owned energy utilities.
The Commission’s staff was investigating the causes of a nine-day
electric power outage in Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Inc.’s (Con Edison) Long Island City, Queens, network, an
outage that affected as many as 175,000 people. 1 The Joint
Proposal, as approved, provided for termination of the
Commission’s review of the utility’s outage-related decisions in
exchange for a rate benefit of $46 million for all Con Edison
customers, and a $17 million community benefit fund for Western
Queens. This benefit was dedicated half to bill credits to area
customers, and half to planting trees and delivering additional
environmental and energy-usage reducing enhancements to the
Adjunct, Albany Law School and State University of New York at Albany;
Administrative Law Judge, New York State Public Service Commission. The
author would like to thank Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey Stockholm, for his
valuable suggestions. However, this piece represents solely the author’s opinions
and not those of the Public Service Commission or any other of its employees.
1. See DEP ’T OF P UB. SERV., S TAFF REPORT ON ITS I NVESTIGATION OF THE
J ULY 2006 EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND P OWER O UTAGES IN C ON EDISON ’S LONG
I SLAND CITY NETWORK IN QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK 2 (2007),
http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/F813FD973CA23102
85257267004B9E83/$File/LIC_FINAL_REPORT_FEB_9_07.pdf?OpenElement.
∗
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communities directly affected by the power outage. Of those
funds, $500,000 was earmarked for a study of the outage’s
economic and health consequences. Finally, Con Edison agreed
its CEO would sign and send to customers a letter of apology.
This is an examination of the settlement process leading up
to this agreement in the context of an administrative proceeding. 2
The agreement reflected the determination and dedication of the
participating parties, and stands as an example of the critical
advantage offered by alternative dispute resolution practice: the
opportunity to create value in a situation where participants are
polarized or stalemated. 3 Changing the terms of the discourse,
not once but repeatedly, opened possibilities for agreement even
when some parties perceived the negotiation as a zero-sum
situation where no agreement seemed possible. And the parties’
Joint Proposal, approved by the Commission, afforded a multifaceted and meaningful outcome, beyond the authority of an
administrative agency otherwise left to craft equitable remedies.
2. In the initial stages of this investigation, the author presided as
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the establishment of the early procedural
steps in what began as a New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) Staff
investigation. In April 2006, Judge Jeffrey Stockholm was assigned to preside
over a second, litigated prudence phase, and the author became the mediator.
The NYPSC has an active alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practice, spelled
out in detail on its web site. N.Y. State Public Service Commission, Dispute
Resolution at the Department of Public Service, http://www.dps.state.ny.us
/ADR_Overview.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Not only are numerous
individual cases resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods but,
these approaches have been institutionalized. Both a litigation and a settlement
ALJ will be assigned to new cases, where appropriate. The two judges do not
communicate about substantive matters under discussion at the negotiating
table. This protocol prevents the decision-maker from learning about settlement
offers. Parties have the opportunity to sit down with each other and a neutral
mediator; and at the same time to litigate unresolved disputes before a litigation
judge. A mediator is bound to protect, and not disclose, the substance of
negotiations, discussions or offers to settle. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16,
§ 3.9(e) (2009). Therefore, this essay relies exclusively on the public record in
this proceeding, as well as general sources and experts in the mediation field on
the theory of complex, multi-party public policy dispute resolution. The official
record of this proceeding is available at N.Y. State Public Service Commission,
Queens Power Outage, http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
3. ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 101-05 (2000) (exploring the concept of
negotiation and mediation, in contrast to litigation, not simply distributing
benefits but actually creating value).
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MULTI-PARTY PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

The mediation of a complex, multi-party, public policy
dispute is in some ways just like a two-party private mediation.
All the same tools are brought to bear and the same basic stages
of mediation are negotiated. Practitioners and theorists divide
and name these stages differently, but there is a lingua franca.
The first stage can be called a contracting stage, when the
mediator explores the negotiation process with parties so that all
participants become familiar with mediation 4 and agree on
ground rules, such as confidentiality, mutual respect, or how
much time to set aside for the mediation. The next stage involves
active listening, to elicit from parties the interests or concerns
that underlie their litigation positions, moving from positional
bargaining to interest-based bargaining. 5 Critical to this stage of
the mediation process is the mediator’s continual role in
encouraging all parties to identify their Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 6 After all, any outcome can
only be realistically and productively evaluated in comparison to
the possible outcomes of proceeding with the administrative
litigation. If parties remain focused on what litigation will
provide them, they will tend to seek a negotiated outcome, if for
no other reason than to avoid placing their fate entirely in the
hands of the final decision-maker, who is likely to be unaware of
the full ramifications of the dispute outside the formal record.
As in most cases, during the Long Island City dispute, the
parties bargained in the shadow of the law and the
administrative litigation continued in parallel with the
4. In some cases observed by the author, NYPSC mediators have brought in
a skilled trainer, to expose the negotiating parties to the basic tools and
principles of alternative dispute resolution.
5. See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 329-31 (2005). The common use of a phased approach
should not mask the differences among practitioners and across a wide spectrum
of mediation approaches (from strongly mediator-directed to strictly partycontrolled). Id. at 302-28.
6. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1983)
(contributing to the popularization of the critical concept and breakthrough
approach known as BATNA); see also MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 5, at
125.
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negotiations. As the legal framework of the proceeding evolved
and developed, the respective risk exposures and potential
benefits of the litigation solution swirled and changed as well. In
contrast to the commonly used alternative of halting litigation to
allow negotiations to progress, in this case, the administrative
litigation provided a backdrop that may have brought the
negotiating parties closer to common ground.
From the identification of the parties’ respective interests
comes a brainstorming of options for settlement. In the course of
this process, some bases for what Fisher and Ury term “principled
negotiation” 7 can emerge in determining what the objective
standards or bases for an agreement are. The last stage, or
execution, entails bringing the parties together, ensuring that
they understand the process that is set in motion when they
submit a Joint Proposal to the Commission for its final
determination.
While these stages are common to private and public policy
dispute resolution, a public policy dispute presents some unique
process challenges for a mediator. Among these stages is the
importance of ensuring that all necessary parties are notified that
discussions are ongoing and that they have the opportunity to
take a seat at the negotiating table. Another is the need to, on
the one hand, protect the confidentiality of the mediation process
and, on the other, respect the value of transparency in
government. This tension characterizes public disputes but not
private ones. 8 The model mediation statutes may protect the
confidentiality of the private negotiating table, but fall short on
recognizing that negotiation may be producing results that affect
the public far beyond the participants. 9 In the context of the
NYPSC, a settlement among the parties is merely a Joint
7. See FISHER & URY, supra note 6, at xviii, 10.
8. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL, supra note 5, at 392-93 (citing Lawrence
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L.
REV. 1 (1981) (discussing how private mediations may implicate larger, public
concerns)). For example, in an environmental mediation, parties may reach an
agreement, but that agreement may fail to take into account impacts on a
broader familyof natural resources.
9. See, e.g., 2009 N.Y. Assem. B. No. 8497 (proposing the Uniform Mediation
Act, amending the Civil Practice Law and Rules by adding new article 74 to
provide, in pertinent part, that “a mediation communication is privileged . . .
and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding”).
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Proposal to the Commission. The Joint Proposal must be filed,
and once that happens, it enters the public realm entirely. It will
be subject to public comment, statements in support and in
opposition will be heard, and an evidentiary hearing is held on
the record. Without Commission approval, a Joint Proposal has
no legal effect and the Commission may modify it and decide to
reject some or all of its terms as contrary to public policy. 10
Almost two years after the outage, and following one year of
mediated negotiations, parties crafted an agreement that
provided value to the participants, the utility, New York City and
the Western Queens community.
II. THE JULY 2006 ELECTRIC POWER OUTAGE AND
THE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION
From late July through early August 2006, New York City
experienced two protracted and severe heat waves. The city
suffered three consecutive days at or above 100 degrees, following
five days in the 90-degree range. A New York City Department of
Health study attributed 140 excess deaths to the heat, including
forty from heat stroke. 11 This was New York’s highest heat
stroke mortality on record since 1952. 12
10. For example, parties to a Commission proceeding concerning the siting of
electric or natural gas transmission facilities may seek Commission approval of
the terms of a Joint Proposal mutually arrived at and to the satisfaction of all
parties. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW art. VII (McKinney 2009). However, the
Commission is required to make certain findings and determinations in order to
grant a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the
construction of a transmission facility. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126(1) (McKinney
2009). These findings include that the facility is needed and that it represents
the minimum adverse environmental impact. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 126(1)(a)(c). Therefore, the Commission makes such findings independent of and not
bound by the parties’ consensus as reflected in their Joint Proposal. The instant
case illustrates the Commission’s practice of, at times, modifying an agreement
of all parties—even when one of those parties is Department of Public Service
Staff. See infra The Public Service Commission Adoption of the Joint Proposal
Terms at Part III.E. In approving the settlement, the Commission also modified
it in certain respects.
11. Richard Perez-Pena, Heat Wave was a Factor in 140 Deaths, New York
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
11/16/nyregion/16heat.html; see also Mathias Vuille, Professor, Dep’t of
Atmospheric and Envtl. Scis. at Univ. of Albany, Presentation at Albany Law
School, The Science of Climate Change: Current Knowledge, Uncertainties and
Projects, slides 24-26 (June 24, 2009) (discussing how the July 2006 New York
City heat wave was only a shadow of the one in Europe in August 2003,
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Beginning on July 17, Con Edison experienced problems with
its electric network in Long Island City, Queens. In a perfect
storm of cascading events, critical elements known as feeders 13 in
Con Edison’s system failed. Faced with the choice of maintaining
the network in operation and trying to repair it in that state, or
shutting it down entirely, Con Edison’s emergency leadership
considered the cause of 22,000-35,000 heat-related deaths). An event such as the
European heat wave was expected to occur naturally once in 1,000 years, but
scientists now predict that by 2040 that will be an average summer and by 2060
it will be a cold summer, according to Professor Vuille. No specific weather
pattern, even a heat wave, can be linked to global climate change, and the
record and findings in the Long Island City investigation did not attribute the
outage to climate change effects. However, North American temperatures are
predicted to rise over the next decades, and there are some practical lessons
from what may be a random series of weather events or may be precursors of
what is to come. Cities are engineered to certain parameters of what is expected.
For example, Washington, D.C. can be paralyzed by a snowfall that would
barely be noticed in Buffalo, New York. Our subway systems, shorelines,
airports, and electric power distribution systems are designed to withstand
predictable stresses. When stresses advance beyond what was predicted
historically, systems can and do fail. The recurring and intensifying heat waves,
hurricanes, and floods of the last ten years are causing some cities to reexamine
their flood plain mapping, electric system design and other assumptions, to
anticipate and adapt to climate change effects.
12. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, N.Y. CITY VITAL SIGNS
INVESTIGATION REPORT NOVEMBER 2006 SPECIAL REPORT (2006), http://home2.
nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/survey/survey-2006heatdeaths.pdf; see also
Perez-Pena, supra note 11 (defining the term excess deaths to represent deaths
beyond those statistically expected over a given time period in a given location).
13. See CON EDISON, I NITIAL REPORT ON THE POWER OUTAGES IN
NORTHWEST Q UEENS 1.4-1.6 (2006), http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06
E0894_CE_Initial_Power_Outage_Report.pdf (the Con Edison system is
enormous and complex. Power plants generate electricity that is transmitted
over high-voltage, long distance transmission lines. As described by Con Edison,
these transmission lines,
supply area substations where the voltage is reduced . . . From the area
substations, primary feeders distribute the power and feed a secondary
system. One type of secondary system is called a network system in
which each feeder supplies a network grid of transformers located
throughout local streets. These transformers serve to further reduce the
voltage for use by customers.
Id.

In the case of the Long Island City event, a North Queens substation
supplied the Long Island City network via a total of twenty-two feeders. Long
Island City used a network design, built entirely underground, and designed to
sustain the loss of up to two feeders on a peak summer day. On the worst outage
days, Con Edison lost twelve of the twenty-two feeders in the Long Island City
network. Id.
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decided to continue operating the network with a reduced
capacity, mobilizing its customers to lower their usage. However,
the network failures continued to spread until July 25, with
extensive and protracted customer outages. 14 On July 26, the
New York State Public Service Commission, after monitoring the
unfolding outage and its consequences, instituted a new
proceeding: a Department of Public Service Staff (Staff)
investigation, and this process was set in motion. 15
At the Commission’s direction, 16 the Staff began an
exhaustive examination of the circumstances leading to the
failure of the feeders and the customer outages. The process
encompassed discovery, independent investigation, and an
informal technical conference at which experts for the utility, the
Staff, the City and others exchanged information about the
circumstances and hour-by-hour decisions the company made
during this crisis. 17 Parties began to formulate their own
theories about the course of action Con Edison had taken, and
whether or not it was, in regulatory parlance, “prudent.” During
this process, the utility was restoring its network, replacing
damaged equipment, and reassuring its customers and the City
that the crisis was over. In addition, Con Edison had already

14. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network, Order
Instituting Proceeding and Directing Staff Investigation (July 26, 2006),
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/ WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/0663A
4CE668EE579852571B700671EB5/$File/06e0894_07_26_06.pdf?OpenElement.
15. Id. The New York State Department of Public Service is an executive
agency established by Section 3 of the Public Service Law. The Public Service
Commission’s members are appointed by the governor for six-year terms, with
advice and consent of the State Senate. The governor appoints a commission
chairman, who is also the chief executive officer of the Department and oversees
its staff, pursuant to Public Service Law § 5.
16. Id. at 1.
17. On February 7, 2007, Department of Public Service staff issued its final
report on the Con Edison Long Island City outage; the report details both the
day-to-day unfolding of the outage, and the process used in conducting the
investigation. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE STAFF REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 26, 2006 EQUIPMENT
FAILURES AND POWER OUTAGES IN CON EDISON’S LONG ISLAND CITY NETWORK IN
QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK 14-15 (2007) [hereinafter LIC STAFF REPORT],
available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06E0894 _Comments_attnbzth.
Pdf.
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voluntarily eschewed recovery of $59 million in operation and
maintenance expenses resulting from the outage. 18
Long Island City, in northwestern Queens, is a vibrant
community, including single family and apartment houses, its
streets lined with Greek, Italian, and Spanish restaurants and
small businesses ranging from bakeries to computer services.
Con Edison had roughly 115,000 customer accounts in Long
As the
Island City, estimated to serve 460,000 people. 19
investigation proceeded, so did the public inquiries and outcry
over the duration and the consequences of the outage in the Long
Island City community.
As part of its investigation, the
Commission held a series of nine public statement hearings over
all the affected neighborhoods in Western Queens: Woodside,
Long Island City, and Astoria. 20 At these hearings, with Arabic,
Greek, Korean, Spanish and Turkish interpreters available, a
parade of Con Edison customers berated both the utility and the
regulators.
Speakers included elderly apartment dwellers
stranded without refrigeration or air conditioning during the heat
wave and owners of local electronics services businesses, who

18. Id. at 11. Under normal circumstances, Con Edison would not be able to
recover these costs unless the Commission granted a petition to defer the costs
for future recovery. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 61.1 (2009). If the
Commission found the company acted imprudently, the petition would be
denied.
19. In this report, Con Edison places its Long Island City “customer” total at
115,000). This figure represents utility accounts, rather than individuals. Staff
estimates that a typical utility account serves four individuals. CON EDISON,
INITIAL REPORT ON THE POWER OUTAGES IN NORTHWEST QUEENS 2.1 (2006),
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06E0894_CE_Initial_Power_Outage_Report
.pdf.
20. Press Release, Public Service Commission, Chairman Flynn Initiates
Broad Investigation of Queens Power Outage (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm (announcing hearings in Astoria &
Long Island City, Queens); Announcement, N.Y. State Public Service Commission, Announcement of Additional Public Hearing Regarding Queens Power
Outage (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06 E0894.htm
(announcing an additional hearing in Astoria); Press Release, Public Service
Commission, New Location and Time for NYPSC Power Outage Hearings on
August 3rd & 9th (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06
E0894.htm (announcing hearings in Astoria); Notice, N.Y. State Public Service
Commission, Notice of Additional Public Statement Hearings and Educational
Forums (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm
(announcing hearings in Astoria and Woodside).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11

8

STEIN

2009-10]

LONG ISLAND CITY SETTLEMENT

365

recounted narratives of their vulnerable equipment irreparably
damaged by repeated outages and associated voltage variations.
On February 9, 2007, the Staff issued its final report on the
causes and extent of the Long Island City outage. 21 In its report,
the Staff concluded that about 174,000 people lost service or
experienced low voltage. 22 Other extensive reports were also
published by the New York State Assembly, the New York State
Attorney General, the City of New York and, as required by law,
Con Edison itself. In its report, Con Edison acknowledged an
unusually large number of customer outages. Regretting the
event, Con Edison concluded it acted reasonably and that its
actions prevented a wider network shutdown and further
damage. 23 The Department of Public Service Staff report,
although focused on contemporaneous repair and restoration of
the damaged network, concluded that the company failed to
address underlying network problems or take appropriate actions
to minimize the impact of feeder and other failures. 24 In
addition, the Staff report concluded the utility lacked effective
communication with its customers and public officials about the
extent of the outage, and that Con Edison’s performance was
unreason-able. 25 In many respects, other parties, including New
York City, the Attorney General, Western Queens Power for the
People, New York State Assembly members, and the Utility
Workers agreed. Many parties urged the Commission to expand
its investigation to include a review of the prudence 26 of Con
21. LIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17.
22. Id. at 2.
23. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network, Order
Commencing Prudence Investigation 2-3 (Apr. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Prudence
Order].
24. See LIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.
25. Id. at 8.
26. The concept of “prudence” in utility law is a fundamental one; a regulated
investor-owned utility may only charge its customers for costs of delivering
service incurred prudently—that is, reasonably. A prudence investigation by a
regulatory agency is likely to examine whether the utility behaved in a
reasonable manner, under the circumstances present at the time of the disputed
conduct. Courts have upheld a “general prudence standard” as “what a
reasonable person would do under the circumstances without the benefit of
hindsight.” Rochester Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 501 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App.
Div. 1986). In addition, “[h]istorically, utility expenditures initially have been
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Edison’s decisions during the outage, and its maintenance of its
system and communications with its customers in advance of the
crisis.
Indeed, the lack of effective communications with
customers, the press, and government emerged as a major theme
of both the investigations and the subsequent negotiations. Many
of Con Edison’s customers felt uninformed and misinformed
throughout the crisis.
By its order issued April 18, 2007, the Commission expanded
the scope of this proceeding to determine the prudence of Con
Edison’s actions and practices relating to the outage. 27 The
Commission charged the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with a
threshold determination as to whether the Staff Report provided
“a tenable basis for raising the specter of imprudence [such that]
the utility can be called upon to defend its conduct.” 28
III. THE MEDIATION
A. The Contracting Stage
On the eve of the Commission’s decision to expand the
investigation to a prudence review, Con Edison proposed to seek
an alternative resolution; however, a public exploratory
discussion with parties found no takers, and the prudence
proceeding went forward. 29 Months later, after considerable
discovery and motion practice, exploratory discussions with
several parties led to Con Edison filing and serving all active
parties with a notice of impending settlement negotiations. 30
In order to bring the necessary parties to the table, efforts
were first exerted to ensure that the affected community was
represented. One community group, Western Queens Power for
the People, was formed during the outage and dedicated itself to
assumed to be exercises of reasonable managerial judgment.” See In re New
York City Hous. Auth. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 260 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div.
1965), modifying 17 N.Y.2d 246 (citing Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Tel. Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
Long Island Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 615, 620 (App. Div.
1987).
27. Prudence Order, supra note 23.
28. Id. at 18 (quoting Long Island Lighting Co., 523 N.Y.S.2d at 620).
29. Prudence Order, supra note 23, at 14-15.
30. This filing, and the notice to all parties, is required by Commission
regulation. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(a) (2009).
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participating in the negotiations. In addition, city and local
representatives, including the City itself, the Office of the Queens
Borough President, several members of the New York State
Assembly (most actively Richard Brodsky), the Attorney General,
and other consumer advocates participated and contributed.
Appropriately “setting the table”—agreeing on its shape—is
anything but trivial and was a meaningful first step. 31 For this
process, agreeing that all negotiation meetings would be held in
New York City during the evening represented and symbolized
the strong commitment on the part of the Albany-based NYPSC
staff towards an inclusive process.
The discussions took place under the scrutiny of both press
and politicians. Therefore, the tension between the confidentiality of the settlement process and the need for transparency for
the many government parties to resolve issues of public
importance, posed threshold issues for the ADR efforts.
Addressing these issues meeting-to-meeting, rather than
attempting to enforce an embargo on any public discussion of
mediation effort proved useful in allowing the discussions to move
forward. 32
The thorniest issue in public policy dispute resolution is that
of confidentiality, a hallmark of settlement theory and practice.
The principle of inadmissibility of settlement offers is embodied
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33 At the NYPSC, the
broader principle of confidentiality of negotiations is institutionalized in regulations of the agency. 34 At the same time, the
31. See Andrew D. Seidel, The Use of the Physical Environment in Peace
Negotiations, 32 POL. & DESIGN SYMBOLISM 19 (1978), available at http://www.
jstor.org/pss/1424284 (for a thoughtful exploration of agreeing on the shape of
the table, evoking the international negotiations to end the war in Vietnam—at
a round table).
32. The language of the NYPSC rule governing confidentiality of settlement
discussions provides sufficient flexibility to encompass several approaches.
Ultimately, the parties to the negotiations can establish the level of
confidentiality to some extent, as long as the decision is unanimous. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(d) (2009) (providing that parties shall not
disclose discussions, admissions, concessions and offers to settle “without the
consent of the parties participating in the negotiations”).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(b). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
“[e]vidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs.” Id.
34. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, §§ 3.9(d) & (e) (2009) (discussing
settlement and meditation respectively).
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agency in developing the regulations, also had to ensure that
parties and the public had early and effective notice that
settlement negotiations were being commenced. Notice must be
given once preliminaries are completed and the possibility of
settlement is real. The NYPSC rules ensure notice to all active
parties to the proceeding.
While the agency must ensure transparency and public
accountability as much as possible, it also must ensure that the
substance of negotiation sessions or offers to settle remains
confidential. 35 Further, the Commission adopted an additional
rule to guarantee protection of confidentiality by the mediator.
The rule provides, in pertinent part:
[n]o discussion, admission, concession or offer to stipulate
or settle, whether oral or written, made during any
negotiation session concerning a stipulation or settlement
shall be subject to discovery, or admissible in any
evidentiary hearing against any participant who objects to
its admission” and that participating parties “shall hold
confidential such discussions, admissions, concessions and
offers to settle and shall not disclose them . . . without the
consent of the parties participating in the negotiations.” 36
Specifically as to mediators, NYPSC regulations provide that
these confidentiality provisions “shall apply to a neutral and any
agent or employee of the Department of Public Service
participating in a mediated proceeding. A mediated proceeding is
any process in which an alternative dispute resolution technique
is used to resolve an issue in controversy, where a neutral may be
appointed.” 37 The interpretation of these regulations is often a
subject of dispute, especially where a sizeable community has
been affected.
Parties to negotiations of this type frequently become divided
on the interpretation of NYPSC regulations and make their divergent views known to the press and other media outlets. To deal
35. In addition to the regulations protecting the confidentiality of settlement
negotiations and mediations, section 15 of the Public Service Law makes it a
misdemeanor for an employee of the Department of Public Service to divulge
any confidential information. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2009).
36. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(d) (2009).
37. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(e) (2009).
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with divergent interpretations, the parties can work together to
develop an interpretation agreement that serves as workable
guideline for confidentially requirements.
Another aspect of the contracting phase is to ensure that all
parties understand the process. In a public policy dispute, the
public itself is likely to be sitting at the table, sometimes in the
form of community advocates with little experience in complex
administrative proceedings, and with scarce resources for
extensive participation. These advocates demand and need to
know what a Joint Proposal is; what it means to agree to it; how
it is binding; what will happen before the Commission; who has
the right to oppose a Joint Proposal; and how a party can speak
up in opposition if some but not all of the parties reach an
agreement. Clarifying these questions at the commencement of
negotiations, and developing the answers at every stage are key
mediator functions.
Finally, the initial contracting phase is a decisive one for the
mediator. Any successful mediation practice is based upon the
development of a level of trust between the participating parties
and the mediator. Unlike the presiding judge, the mediator has
no inherent authority, as parties are under no obligation to settle
or to engage with a mediator. Parties are always free to negotiate
without a neutral and any party is free to walk away. While a
court may require parties to sit down with a mediator, even
repeatedly, a court cannot order the parties to settle. Therefore,
the mediator earns a place at the table only by providing a service
that the parties come to value. 38 If there is no added value, then
there is no seat.
B.

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law 39

The mediation took place against the background of basic
principles of public utility regulatory law. First, public utilities
are generally not liable for consequential damages resulting from
utility service problems or failures, and regulatory agencies have
38. Expert mediators and teachers Linda Singer and Michael Lewis of the
Washington, D.C. Center for Dispute Settlement sometimes force this precept
home in their mediator training. The first task of each participant is to convince
the parties they need a mediator, and that he or she is the one.
39. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 101-05.
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authority over rates and service, but none to award civil damages
or require equitable remedies. 40 Second, some, including Con
Edison, have tariff provisions setting a level of compensation to
customers for food spoilage in the event of outages of specified
duration. Following the 2006 outage, that level was raised by a
modest amount, and for maximum reimbursement, required
documentation from the customer on perishables lost due to lack
of refrigeration. 41 In addition, many residential customers
received refunds of approximately $3 representing a prorated
credit for the days without electric service. This minimal
compensation only further enraged many in the community.
A prudence review, however, is the classic hammer of utility
regulators. Generally, a regulated utility is entitled to recoup
rates of all its prudently incurred expenses, a process which
includes a rebuttable presumption of prudence. 42 The standard
for what is considered “prudent” is that the utility’s decisions and
40. For example, the Commission can only recover a penalty or enforce its
orders or regulations by bringing an action to seek a court order for doing so.
N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009).
41. The Commission increased the reimbursement for lost perishable food
from $150 to $200, when residential customers produce an itemized list of
losses; and from $350 to $400 when residential customers produce an itemized
list and proof of loss. In addition, the Commission for the first time required
utility reimbursement for losses of perishable medication. Total reimbursement
per incident was capped at $15 million. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power
Outages in Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City
Electric Network, Order Concerning Tariff Provisions Governing Reimbursement for Food Spoilage 19-21 (Nov. 23, 2007) (on file with author).
42. The Public Service Law does not define “prudence.” The prudence
doctrine arises from the broad general powers of the regulatory commission to
establish just and reasonable utility rates that compensate utility shareholders
for prudent or reasonable investment, and protect ratepayers from the burden of
unreasonable management investment. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(12)
(McKinney 2009). The burden of proof ultimately lies with the utility seeking a
change in rates. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2009). The prudence
review power is described at length in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. New
York Public Service Commission,
[i]n the exercise of its rate-making power, the Public Service Commission
may not deny a utility a reasonable rate of return on its investment . . .
The opportunity to earn a fair return does not mean, however, that a
utility will be permitted to include negligent or wasteful expenditures in
its operating expenses.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 507 N.E.2d 287, 291 (N.Y.
1987).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11

14

STEIN

2009-10]

LONG ISLAND CITY SETTLEMENT

371

actions, under the circumstances at the time, were reasonable.
The regulator is not entitled to apply the wisdom of hindsight to
those actions and decisions. Should the regulator conclude, after
a hearing, that the utility acted imprudently, then those costs
incurred as a result of the imprudent action will be disallowed
and the imprudent investment will be removed from the
company’s rates. 43 These costs, in other words, will be borne by
the utility’s shareholders, not its customers. This is the harshest
remedy available to the regulator without judicial imprimatur,
and its consequences can be costly to the utility. 44 However, it is
not a remedy likely to afford comfort to any particular customer
or group of customers, as the rate adjustment is spread across the
entire customer base, and ends up as pennies on an individual’s
monthly bill.
These limited remedies are the only ones available to the
regulator by law. The limitations themselves, however, created
the conditions for parties to seek more satisfying forms of redress
and resolution. To do so, they were forced to seek voluntary or
consensus remedies. In other words, the limitations of utility law
lower the BATNA for the parties seeking more meaningful or
holistic concessions from the utility.
For those seeking redress against a utility, however, the
possibility of a public finding by the regulator that a utility’s
conduct was imprudent may have a symbolic value all on its own.
Parties had to assess the limitations of a litigated case and if the
case proceeded to a litigated outcome, knowing that if the
Commission were to find the company imprudent and reduce
system-wide rates accordingly, no additional remedies would be
available to community members. This is inherently a difficult
balance to strike and can only be resolved by the addition of
positive value on the side of the settlement. 45
The mediation goal should be to assist parties in moving
away from a purely distributive solution (a fifty-fifty split is the
43. See id.
44. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 615,
624 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that the prudence investigation into cost overruns
during the construction of the former Long Island Lighting Company’s
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station resulted, after judicial review, in over $600
million in prudence disallowances).
45. Or, as many mediators say, “It’s a good idea to try to enlarge the pie
before you start to slice it up.”
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paradigm) and towards a more lasting and profound resolution.
This depends upon the parties identifying an objective standard
of some kind, to move from a position-based to a principle-based
negotiation. 46 In this case, the standard emerged as one of
returning value to the community; value which had been reduced
by the outage and its circumstances. Against this standard, a
varied set of measures to return value began to emerge at the
negotiating table, creating the conditions for execution of an
agreement.
C.

Identifying the BATNA: What were Parties’ Best
Alternatives to Settlement?

A key February 2008 ruling by Administrative Law Judge
Stockholm may have raised the utility’s estimate of its exposure
in the face of an ongoing and possibly expanded prudence review,
as well as potentially increasing the utility’s exposure to civil
damages. 47 In July 2007, parties filed arguments and evidence
intended to establish a prima facie case of utility imprudence, to
shift the burden of production of evidence of prudence to the
utility. The purpose of the ruling was to determine which of the
numerous imprudence allegations levied by some parties against
the utility required a response from Con Edison. In the judge’s
words, the question as to each imprudence allegation was
“whether sufficient facts have been alleged and causal arguments
posited that a reasonable person would require Con Edison to
submit an affirmative case.” 48 The judge reviewed each listed
allegation, and upheld most allegations as requiring a Con Edison
response. These were grouped, and included: (1) failing to have
in place protocols or information systems to effectively assess
distribution system conditions; (2) failing to adequately upgrade
and maintain its Long Island City distribution system in the
years leading up to the outage; (3) failing to have adequate
46. FISHER & URY, supra note 6, at 83.
47. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc.'s Long Island City Electric Network—Prudence
Phase, Ruling on Scope of Testimony, Schedule, and Discovery (Feb. 8, 2008),
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/0/7ED475CE
D8AD31A6852573E900770D0D/$File/06e0894_Ruling.pdf?OpenElement.
48. Id. at 5.
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emergency preparedness plans; and (4) failing to take reasonable
steps to reduce load before and during the outage. 49 As a result
of this ruling, these issues were destined for trial.
In addition, the ALJ ruled that the Consumer Protection
Board and the Attorney General raised a convincing argument
that the company’s actions should be measured against a gross
negligence standard. A Commission finding that Con Edison was
grossly negligent—rather than simply imprudent—could expand
its liability 50 and would certainly damage its reputation for
reliability. The judge concluded that the proceeding could include
an examination of the company’s actions against a gross
negligence standard. This ruling could have lowered the utility’s
BATNA and concomitantly raised its willingness to add value
onto the settlement side of the scale.
D. The Execution: The Joint Proposal
During the endgame phase, the negotiations are brought
together to form a conclusion. The parties draft the language of
the proposal itself, and each must decide whether or not to sign,
to support, to remain silent, or to oppose. At this stage of
negotiation of a long-lived settlement, it is axiomatic that there
will be details impossible for the parties to foresee and plan for.
At this point, not seeking agreement on all the implementation
details, but instead seeking agreement on a process to resolve
those implementation issues when they arise can avoid an
eleventh-hour impasse and preserve the overall consensus. Also,
equally important is the inclusion of a dispute-resolution
mechanism.
The structure and administration of environmental benefit
funding is a relevant example to look at. Instead of choosing the
organization or administrator to manage funds and oversee tree
planting and other energy-saving environmental projects, the
parties agreed upon a mutually acceptable process for a choice to
be made, but did not themselves make the choice at the time of
execution of the Joint Proposal. In its order which adopted the
49. Id. at 4-9.
50. Under certain circumstances, a Commission determination could have a
collateral effect on a subsequent judicial proceeding on identical issues. See
Allied Chem. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 528 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1988).
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terms of the Joint Proposal, the Commission directed the parties
to identify, for commissioners, the chosen administrator for tree
planting and greening projects. The Commission reserved fortyfive days to reject the choice. In fact, the process went, as
anticipated, in the Joint Proposal and a Greening Administrator
was selected, as well as an entity conducting the study.
Two years after beginning the outage investigation, the
NYPSC adopted the material terms of the Joint Proposal. 51 The
Joint Proposal was signed and supported by Con Edison, NYPSC
Staff, the New York State Consumer Protection Board, Western
Queens Power for the People, New York State Assembly Member
Richard Brodsky, New York City, and the Public Utility Law
Project. No opposing statements were filed with the NYPSC.
E. The Public Service Commission Adoption of the
Joint
Proposal Terms
The specific terms of the Joint Proposal included the
following. First, rate benefits were afforded to all Con Edison
customers by disallowing the inclusion in the company’s rates of
$40 million of costs incurred to replace and repair its delivery
system. Additionally, Con Edison agreed not to seek recovery of
$6 million in associated carrying charges. In addition, Con
Edison made available $17 million in benefit funds for the
communities directly affected by the Long Island City network
outage. The $17 million encompassed direct payments and bill
credits including: (1) a bill credit of $100 to each residential
customer; (2) a bill credit of $200 to each small business
customer; (3) a bill credit of $350 to each large business customer;
(4) a payment of $100 to each residential claimant; and (5) $200
for each business claimant for food spoilage. It also included
$500,000 for a research entity (with a process for its selection by
signatory parties) to study economic and health impacts of the
outages. Of the roughly $9 million remaining, one half was to be
51. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consol. Edison
Company of N.Y., Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network—Prudence Phase,
Order Adopting Terms of Joint Proposal with Modifications (July 24, 2008),
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/0/A991CF5
BB6DBE56F85257490004709B9/$File/303_06e0894_FINAL.pdf?OpenElement.
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paid to a tree-planting organization (with a process to select it)
for planting trees in affected communities, over and above New
York City’s tree-planting program (the One Million Trees
initiative). The other half was to be paid to a Greening Projects
Administrator (with a process for its selection) for other
environmental initiatives, which “may include additional tree
planting, the installation of measures that improve indoor or
outdoor air quality, and other initiatives to improve the
environment” within the community that suffered the outage. 52
The Joint Proposal also required that Con Edison offer an
apology—in English and Spanish—expressing the company’s
sincere regrets for the network power outage and its
consequences, for its performance, and for the extended hardships
experienced by its customers as a result. 53 In its review of the
terms of the Joint Proposal, the Commission insisted the apology
be signed by the utility’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
and mailed separately to each customer, to which Con Edison
agreed. 54 And in exchange for all of the above, the prudence
investigation was terminated.
In its order adopting the Joint Proposal terms, the
Commission noted that “[a]s all parties have recognized, these
benefits would not be available in a Commission order, except
with the consent of the parties . . . We expect the greening
projects contemplated under the Joint Proposal to assist in
improving energy efficiency and reducing demand, in part due to
the cooling characteristics of adding trees and other greening
projects in metropolitan areas.” 55
AFTERWORD
On the issue of whether the value was returned, indications
are that it was. As the study nears completion, the Greening
Administrator has been selected and the payments and refunds
have been received; none of which could have resulted from the
prudence litigation. One of the community representatives to the
negotiations reported that the morning after the Con Edison
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
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checks arrived in customers’ mailboxes—two years after the
outage—she was pleasantly surprised to step out of her elevator
on the way to work and be greeted by a round of applause from
her neighbors. Additionally, Con Edison recently announced a $6
million, eighteen-month smart grid pilot in northwestern Queens,
the same area that suffered from the 2006 outage. The pilot will
test a state-of-the-art technological upgrade to significantly
reduce electricity usage, and to monitor infrastructure problems,
by empowering consumers to track and control their own energy
use. 56

56. Simon Akam, Con Ed Tests a ‘Smart Grid’ in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2009, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/con-ed-tests-asmart-grid-in-queens.
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